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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NOS. 44679 & 44680
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) BANNOCK COUNTY NOS. CR 2011-1583
v. ) & CR 2016-5480
)
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Miranda Hardy pled guilty to DUI in a 2016 case and
admitted violating her probation in a separate, 2011, DUI case.  The cases were consolidated for
hearing  and  the  district  court  imposed  a  sentence  of  seven  years,  with  two  years  fixed,  in  the
2016 case; and, upon revoking probation in the 2011 DUI case, imposed a concurrent, seven-
year sentence, with three years fixed.  Ms. Hardy filed a Rule 35 motion in the 2016 case, and, at
the hearing held on that motion, requested a lesser sentence in her 2011 case.  The district court
denied the motion.  Ms. Hardy filed appeals in both cases, and now asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentence in the 2016 case, and, mindful of the fact
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that her Rule 35 motion was not timely filed in the 2011 case, she asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by denying that motion.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2011, Ms. Hardy was charged with felony DUI; she later pled guilty and received a
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.175-182; Tr., p.19, L.20, p.39, Ls.23-25.)
The district court retained jurisdiction, and, after Ms. Hardy successfully completed a rider
program, the court granted her probation.  (R., pp.185-187; Tr., p.39, Ls.23-25, p.47, Ls.7-10.)
Later, the district court revoked that probation after finding Ms. Hardy violated her
probation.  (Tr., p.59, L.20, p.60, Ls.22-25.)  The court retained jurisdiction to allow Ms. Hardy
to complete a second rider program to help her address her alcohol addiction.  (Tr., p.64, Ls.16-
23.)  Ms. Hardy successfully completed the program and was placed on probation again.
(Tr., p.73, Ls.13-17.)
Ms. Hardy relapsed while on probation, and in April of 2016, found herself arrested and
facing a new felony DUI charge. (Tr., p.76, Ls.13-14.)  While in jail, she obtained permission
from the court to participate in a treatment program pending further court proceedings;
Ms. Hardy successfully completed that program in July of 2016.  (PSI, pp.96, 102-104; Tr., p.76,
Ls.13-14, p.84, Ls.1-3.)1
Later, pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Ms. Hardy pled guilty to the 2016 DUI,
her second felony (Tr., p.93, Ls.14-16), and admitted violating her probation in the previous,
2011 DUI case (Tr., p.95, Ls.17).  The parties also agreed to jointly recommend concurrent
1Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and attached materials will use the designation
“PSI” and will include the page numbers associated with the 104-page electronic file containing
those documents.
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sentences and a rider. (Tr. p.102, Ls.11-16.)
The combined sentencing and dispositional hearing took place on October 3, 2016.
(Tr., p.98, Ls.5-9.)  In the 2016 DUI case, the district court imposed a unified seven-year
sentence, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.312-314; Tr., p.107, Ls.17-19.)  In the 2011 DUI case,
the district court revoked probation and imposed a unified seven-year sentence, with three years
fixed.  (Tr., p.108, Ls.4-7.)  The court ordered the sentences to run concurrent, but refused to
follow the parties’ recommendation for a rider, declining to retain jurisdiction in either case.
(Tr., p.108, Ls.15-17.)  On October 6, 2016, the court entered its judgment imposing sentence in
the 2016 case (R., pp.312-314), and an order revoking probation in the 2011 case (R., pp.200-
210).
On October 13, 2016, Ms. Hardy filed a Rule 35 motion in 2016 DUI case seeking to
reduce her sentence.  (R., pp.316-317.)  At the hearing on the motion, held October 31, 2016,
Ms. Hardy asked the court to consider retaining jurisdiction in both the 2016 case and the 2011
case.  (Tr., p.111, Ls.6-7; see also R., p.322).  She additionally asked the court to modify her
sentence in the 2011 case, to reduce the fixed period in order to mirror that of her sentence in the
2016 DUI case.  (Tr., p.110, L.19-p.111, L.4.)
The district court denied the motion, and, on November 1, 2016, entered a written order
in each case.  (R., pp.215-216, 322-323.)  On November 16, 2016, Ms. Hardy filed notices of
appeal in each case. (R., pp.217-220, 324-326.)  This Court consolidated the appeals.2
2 On December 19, 2016, this Court ordered the appeals consolidated for all purposes (See Order
to Consolidate Appeals for All Purposes, dated 12/19/2016).
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ISSUES
1.  Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence, without
retaining jurisdiction, in the 2016 DUI case?
2.  Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Hardy’s Rule 35 request to
reduce her sentence in the 2011 DUI case, in light of the new information she presented?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence of Seven
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Without Retaining Jurisdiction, In The 2016 DUI Case
A. Introduction
  Ms.  Hardy  asserts  that  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when,  in  the  2016  DUI
case, it imposed a seven-year sentence, with two years fixed, and refused to retain jurisdiction.3
Given Ms. Hardy’s history of alcohol addiction, and her demonstrated willingness to participate
in new, beneficial treatment programs, the sentence imposed was excessive, and the court’s
refusal to retain jurisdiction was unreasonable.
B. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs if the district court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable “under any reasonable
view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); see also State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
3Ms. Hardy does not challenge the district court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion in her 2016 DUI
case, because she did not present any new information in support that motion. See State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  Because Ms. Hardy filed her Rule 35 motion within 14
days of the judgment of conviction, the time to appeal from her judgment of conviction was
extended to 42 days after the denial of her Rule 35 motion. See I.A.R. 14(a).
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will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard for the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” State v. Williams, 151
Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).  When a defendant
challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, this Court will conduct an independent review of
the record, taking into account “the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011).  The Court reviews
the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district
court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable, and thus excessive, “under any reasonable view of
the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568
(Ct. App. 1982).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.
The  district  court  also  has  the  discretion  to  retain  jurisdiction. See I.C. § 19–2601(4).
The primary purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court
additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for
probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677 (Ct. App. 2005). The sentencing court’s refusal to
retain jurisdiction is not an abuse of discretion if the court already has sufficient information
upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. Id., 141
Idaho 673, 677.
C. The District Court’s Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Seven Years,
With Two Fixed, Without Retaining Jurisdiction
Miranda Hardy’s history with alcohol addiction, and her potential for overcoming that
addiction, are strong mitigating factors in this case. See State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).  She grew up surrounded by alcohol, and
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she began drinking when she was sixteen years old.  (PSI, pp.8, 79.)  She has been in emergency
rooms multiple times for injuries related to her alcohol abuse and her inability to cope with her
addiction.  (PSI, pp.2, 75.)  Although recovery thus far has been elusive for Ms. Hardy, she
knows she needs help, and she has consistently asked the court for treatment.  (PSI, pp.103-104.)
Ms. Hardy has embraced the rider programs and community-based treatments offered to
her in the past (PSI, p.79), but she has struggled with aftercare, lacking relapse prevention plans
and the skills to follow them.  (PSI, pp.75-76.)  She knows she needs more help, and that her
recovery must continue in a safe and structured environment.  (PSI, p.76.)  According to her
most recent GAIN-1 assessment, Ms. Hardy could benefit from additional rehabilitation
programs; specifically, a cognitive-behavior based treatment program, to help her develop the
skills needed to maintain abstinence and recovery goals, and substance testing to ensure her
compliance.  (PSI, pp.73, 88).  Such programing would “also assist her in gaining the insight she
is searching for and possibly help her to obtain the skills to begin living a crime-free life in the
future.”  (PSI, p.76.)
In her letter thanking the court for the interim opportunity with the SHARE program,
Ms. Hardy wrote:
During the course of the program I’ve learned more about my addiction.  The area
where I feel I lacked the knowledge is my thinking errors and my denial of my
addiction and habits … I now know that sobriety and recovery doesn’t just
happen when I take away my drinking but one day at a time and when I take steps
in changing my thinking patterns and beliefs.
(PSI, pp.103-104.)
At her sentencing hearing, Ms. Hardy asked the court for new tools and another chance to
prove herself worthy of probation:
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I know that they have a new program now, and one of them I heard was the cognitive
self-change.  I have never done that before, and I feel like I could benefit from it.  …  I
want a chance to fix my life.  I don’t want to be like this forever.
(Tr., p.103, Ls.19-24, p.104, Ls.20-22.)
Ms. Hardy’s past successes in program completion, along with her attitude and increasing
self-awareness, illustrate her strong rehabilitation potential.
Finally, Ms. Hardy’s remorse and responsibility for her actions serve as mitigation. See
Coffin, 146 Idaho at 171.  At sentencing, she candidly admitted her relapse and failure while on
probation, and she told the court “I do take full responsibility, full responsibility for my decisions
that led me to everything at that point.”  (Tr., p.103, Ls.17-19.)
In light of these mitigating factors, and despite the aggravating factors, Ms. Hardy
contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, without
retaining jurisdiction.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Hardy’s Rule 35 Request To
Retain Jurisdiction, Or Else Alter Her Sentence In The 2011 DUI Case, In Light Of New
Information
A. Introduction
Mindful of the fact that the order revoking probation and imposing sentence was entered
October 6, 2016, and that her requests for Rule 35 leniency in the 2011 DUI case were made at
the Rule 35 hearing, held October 31, 2016, but not presented in the written motion filed in the
2016 case,4 Ms. Hardy contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
4On October 6, 2016, the court entered its order revoking probation in the 2011 DUI case, and its
judgment and sentence in the 2016 case.  (R., pp.200-210, 312-14.)  On October 13, Ms. Hardy
filed a written Rule 35 motion in the 2016 DUI case.  (R., pp.316-317.)  She made an oral
request for Rule 35 leniency the 2011 case at the Rule 35 hearing, held October 31.  (Tr., p.110,
L.19-p.111, L.4.)
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Rule 35 requests to reduce her sentence in the 2011 case, and retain jurisdiction.
B. Standard Of Review
“A  motion  for  reduction  of  sentence  under  I.C.R.  35  is  essentially  a  plea  for  leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006).  In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply  the  same  criteria  used  for  determining  the  reasonableness  of  the  original  sentence.”
State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014).  “[T]o prevail, the appellant must establish
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.” State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 876 (2011).  The Court “conduct[s] an
independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276
(Ct. App. 2000).
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Hardy’s Rule 35 Request
For Reduction Of Sentence.
At the Rule 35 hearing, counsel for Ms. Hardy asked the court to modify the fixed portion
of the seven-year sentence, from three years to two years, in order to mirror the concurrent
sentence imposed in her 2016 DUI case.  (Tr., p.110, Ls.21-22.)  In support of this request,
counsel informed the court of a letter he received from Ms. Hardy which states that the requested
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change would enable Ms. Hardy to access programming more quickly.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.)  In
light of this new information, and in view of Ms. Hardy’s demonstrated desire and desperate
need to begin treatment, the district court’s refusals to modify her sentence in the 2011 DUI case,
or to retain jurisdiction to allow Ms. Hardy additional time and beneficial programing to help her
demonstrate her suitability for probation, were unreasonable, and represent an abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Hardy respectfully requests that this Court remand his cases to the district court with
instructions that it retain jurisdiction, or else impose reasonable, less harsh sentences.
Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2017.
___________/s/______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of











BANNOCK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
KAC/eas
